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The CIA's Secret Funding
and the Constitution
If you knew how much we spend and how much money we





Once again the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is in the news.
The controversy now focuses on an alleged massive intelligence op-
eration by the CIA against groups in the United States,2 rather than
on the necessity or wisdom of CIA covert intervention in Chile.3 How-
ever, it has largely ignored a prior issue, the massive secrecy that en-
velops the CIA. Even the simple total of CIA expenditures, estimated
now at $750 million,4 is kept from the public. In addition, Congress
as a whole makes no appropriation to the CIA; the agency's funds
are covertly transferred from the appropriations made to other gov-
ernmental units.5 The vast majority of Congress-and the public-
know nothing of the amounts involved. This funding secrecy may be
unconstitutional.
Article I, § 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
1. Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1973, at A 9, col. 8. Ellender was then Chairman of the In-
telligence Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
2. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 25, 1974, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 29,
1974, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 30, 1974, at 1, col. 3; Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1974, at A I, col. 6, 8.
3. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 7; Sept. 21, 1974, at 12, col. 3; Sept. 22, 1974,
§ 4, at 21, col. 2; Oct. 21, 1974, at 2, col. 3; Oct. 23, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 9,
1974, at 1, col. 4.
4. 119 CONG. REC. S6868 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). Marchetti
and Marks would place the actual expenditures substantially higher. V. MARCHETI & J.
MIARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 59-73 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MAR-
CHErI & MARKS]. MARCHETrI & MARKS, published with a number of deletions suggested by
the CIA, has been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
1309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). The final form of the book will be
determined by rulings on appeals by both parties.
5. 50 U.S.C. 403f(a) (1970) authorizes the CIA to "transfer to and receive from other
Government Agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget for the performance of any of the functions or activities authorized under Sections
403 and 405 of this title...." See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
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On its face the Clause permits no exceptions to the requirement of
an appropriation and an accounting. But the Clause is not self-de-
fining; the first part leaves open the question of what are "appro-
priations made by law." The second part defines neither "regular
statement and account" nor "from time to time." Cases involving
the Clause" have been rare and have provided no definitive test
against which the CIA practice can be measured. Moreover, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to pass on the constitutionality of the
practice in the near future. Just last term, in United States v.
Richardson,7 the Court held by a five-four majority that a plaintiff
lacked standing as a taxpayer under the Clause to compel publication
of the CIA's expenditures. But the constitutional issue is by no means
foreclosed. The Court failed to reach the merits, and there may
yet be plaintiffs-members of Congress, for example8-who could sur-
mount the standing barrier.
This Note defines the meaning of the Clause by examining its
language, history, and purposes, and it analyzes possible justifications
for the present funding and disclosure practices. It concludes that
the failure to make a specific appropriation to the agency and the
failure to provide information about expenditures to the public
are violations of the Constitution. Finally, it suggests the outlines
of a test for budgetary disclosure in security-sensitive government
operations.
I. The History of the Clause
Clause 7 was not the subject of extensive debate at the Constitu-
tional Convention. The first part of the Clause, providing for con-
gressional power over appropriations, was introduced early in the
convention and remained basically unchanged.10
This congressional power took on a new importance in light of
6. See cases cited in notes 7, 35-39 infra.
7. 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
8. See generally Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665
(1974). Other possible plaintiffs range from CIA pensioners, see MARCHEri &- MARKS, supra
note 4, at 64-65, to voters alleging that their franchise has been impaired because of the
lack of constitutionally mandated disclosure of information on receipts and expenditures
of public money.
Even if no plaintiff were found to have standing, the issue of what constitutes com-
pliance with the constitutional requirement is still important to Congress and to the
agencies responsible for transferring funds to the CIA and for preparing the accounts
required by the Constitution.
9. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 524, 545 (1911)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS].
10. 2 id. at 14, 280, 509.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 608, 1975
the grant to Congress of the power to impose customs and levy
taxes, a grant which marked a significant change from the system
under the Articles of Confederation."
The idea of an accounting of government spending, required un-
der the second part of the Clause, was familiar; a provision for an
accounting had existed under the Articles.' 2 Yet no similar provi-
sion was proposed until the closing days of the Convention 3 when
Mason introduced a clause requiring that an account of public ex-
penditures be published annually.'4 Madison proposed to replace
"annually" with language that would leave the timing of the pub-
lication to the legislature.' 5 Supporters of Madison's amendment
argued that if the interval were fixed and proved to be too short,
the statements would cease as they had done under the Articles,'0
be incomplete,17 or be too general to be satisfactory.' 8 The amend-
ment was adopted and the Clause rephrased to its present form with
reports to be published "from time to time."' 9
At the state ratifying conventions the issue arose once more. It
11. Under the Articles of Confederation, only the states, not the central government,
could levy taxes. See H. HocKEr, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 149
(1939).
12. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided that the
United States in Congress assembled shall have the authority to ascertain the neces-
sary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States and to appro-
priate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses-to borrow money or
emit bills on the Credit of the United States transmitting every half-year to the
respective states an account of the sums so borrowed or emitted.
The provision for a report may not have been particularly important under the Articles,
as the central government did not have the power to levy taxes. Whatever its importance,
as a matter of practice reporting had ceased under the Articles. See note 15 infra.
13. It was considered, after the Committee of Style had reported its draft of the Con-
stitution, along with a number of measures which some members of the Convention felt
were "trivial" and were "delaying the completion of the work." M. FARR.AND, THE FRAMING
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 188-89 (1913). Among these items were the
prohibition of capitation or any other direct tax and the prohibition of state laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts. Id. Farrand suggests that some of these were ac-
cepted by the majority as long as no important principles were involved in order that the
final action of the Convention would be unanimous. Id. This, however, should not be
taken to mean that the principles represented by the additions, were unimportant. See,
e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
14. 2 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 618.
15. Mr. Madison proposed to strike out "annually" from the motion & insert "from
time to time" which would enjoin the duty of the frequent publications and leave
enough to the discretion of the Legislature. Require too much and the difficulty will
beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles of Confederation require half-yearly
publications on this subject-A punctual compliance being often impossible, the
practice has ceased altogether.
Id. (reproducing the original record).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 619 (statement of Fitzsimmons).
18. "Mr. King remarked, that the term expenditures went to every minute shilling.
This would be impracticable. Congs. might indeed make a monthly publication, but it
would be insuch general Statements as would afford no satisfactory information." Id. at
618.
19. Id. at 619.
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was argued that the absence of a fixed interval could result in no
information being published and might in fact allow misapplication
of funds to be concealed forever.20 Proponents of the Clause again
responded that leaving the interval to be fixed by CongTess would
result in fuller information being published, since no agency would
be forced to publish an incomplete report to meet an inflexible and
unrealistic deadline. 21 They ridiculed the possibility that giving Con-
gress discretion as to the frequency of publication would mean that
information would be concealed forever; Congress would publish the
reports at regular, frequent intervals.
22
The debates yield no detailed or comprehensive statement of the
purposes of the Clause. No one, however, disagreed with Mason's
assertion that the public had a "right to know" how the public money
was being spent.2 3 The main problem considered in the debates was
how best to make such information available in a fashion which
would allow for its "thorough comprehension."
2 4
II. The Purposes of the Clause
Congress's power and responsibility under the Clause could be
given a broad or a narrow reading, as could the people's right to
information. It is important, therefore, that the Clause be viewed
in the light of its place in the larger constitutional structure.25 Un-
der the form of government established, the powers of government
20. See, e.g., D. ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF
VIRGINIA, 1788, at 326 (1805); p. 622 infra.
In New York, Smith echoed Mason's fear that the statements might be withheld until
the information in them was useless. "From time to time" he noted might mean "from
century to century." The Chancellor of New York replied, asking "[I]f the public were
more anxious about any thing under heaven than the expenditure of their money. Will
not the representatives ... consider it as essential to their popularity, to gratify their
constituents with full and frequent statements of the public accounts? There can be no
doubt of it." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN TIlE SEVERAl. STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
o THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 347 (1836). The New York convention was not as sanguine
as the Chancellor and voted a proposed amendment to the Constitution which read in
part, "Provided that the words front time to time shall be so construed, as that the
receipts and expenditures of public money shall be published at least once in every
year...." Id. at 407.
21. See p. 622 infra.
22. Lee labelled Mason's argument trivial. "From time to time" was "sufficiently ex-
plicit and satisfactory," and meant, "in the common acceptance of language, short, con-
venient periods." D. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 326.
23. Id. (remarks of George Mason). See generally 3 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 149-50
("when the Public Money is lodged in its Treasury... the People who give their Money
ought to know in what manner it is expended") (remarks of James McHenry before the
Maryland House of Delegates). Nor was there any suggestion in the debates that Congress
could or would deprive itself of the information.
24. See p. 622 infra.
25. For a presentation of this type of approach, see C. BLACK, STRUCTuRE AND RELA-
TIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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rest upon the consent of the governed.26 Such a system is based on
full public participation which in turn depends on the public's ac-
cess to information .2 7 As Madison wrote:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And
a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives .
2
The importance of such participation and information has been
recognized in numerous ways. The Supreme Court has evolved a defi-
nition of the First Amendment which is based on the necessity of
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" 29 debate on public issues. Con-
gress through several measures30 has established a pqlicy of maximum
possible disclosure based on the premise that "[a] democratic society
requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of
the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information
varies." 3' 1 Even the latest revision of the system of executive classi-
26. See Declaration of Independence:
[T]o secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed....
Cf. H. ARENDT, CRIsES OF THE REPUBLIC 85 (1972) (analsis of the concept of the consent
of the governed in America, concluding that it necesarily entails "consent, not in the
very old sense of mere acquiescence, with its distinction between rule over willing subjects
and rule over unwilling ones, but in the sense of active support and continuing participa-
tion in all matters of public interest").
27. The withholding of information eventually leads to a diminished participation in
government, J. WcIGINs, FREEDOM OR SECRECY? (1964), because the citizen feels that he or
she is the victim of propaganda and has nothing to add to the debate but personal
suspicions. H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 35-36 (1950). As
President Nixon wrote:
When information which properly belongs to the people is systematically withheld
by those in power, the people soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful
of those who manage them, and eventually incapable of determining their own destiny.
Quoted in HARv. L. SCH. BULL., June 1973, at 8.
28. Letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 THE WRIEINGS OF JAMrS MADISON 103 (G.
Hunt ed. 1910).
29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Obviously without access to information
"the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate" envisioned in Sullivan becomes exchange
without substance. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971); United
States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[e]ffective self-
government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unim-
peded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected
to critique, rebuttal, and reexamination").
30. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 1974
Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974t); Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321-47 (1970). Section 102(c), id. §
4332(c), of the NEPA has been interpreted as providing a means of bringing the critical
evaluation of the public to bear on administrative agency decisionmaking. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972) (Army Corps of Engineers'
environmental impact statement held inadequate to meet requirements ot § 102(c)).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
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fication, 32 which is designed to restrict access to information, was based
on the asserted ground that government information should be readily
available to the public.33
Both parts of the Clause are important; the purposes of each merit
separate treatment. Justice Story, writing in the early 19th century,
succinctly described the purposes of the first part:
It is to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the dis-
bursements of the public money. As all the taxes raised from the
people, as well as the revenues arising from other sources, are to
be applied to the discharge of the expenses, and debts, and other
engagements of the government, it is highly proper, that Con-
gress should possess the power to decide how and when any
money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise,
the executive would possess an unbounded power over the public
purse of the nation, and might apply all its moneyed resources
at his pleasure. The power to control and direct the appropriations
constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and
extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public pecu-
lation .... It is wise to interpose in a republic, every restraint,
by which the public treasure, the common fund of all, should be
applied with unshrinking honesty to such objects as legitimately
belong to the common defence and the general welfare. 34
The Clause has been interpreted as providing Congress with absolute
control over the public funds.35 Congress exercises this authority by
making appropriations, which are by definition specific amounts of
money set aside for designated purposes.30 It is not required to par-
ticularize each item in order for an appropriation to be valid,3 7 but
32. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339-50 (1974).
33. Id. at 339. The policy of maximum disclosure was also instituted because the with-
holding of material which could be safely revealed undercut claims for the withholding
of more sensitive material. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9798 (1951) (establishing
an earlier version of the classification system). Justice Stewart has noted:
For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes
one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those
intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hall-
mark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible
disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is
maintained.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (concurring opinion). See
generally Rabi, The Cost of Secrecy, ATL. MONTHLY, Aug. 1960, at 41.
34. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348, at
222-23 (5th ed. 1891) (emphasis added).
35. Ohio v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946); Burk-
hardt v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 658, 84 F. Supp. 553 (1949); Hart's Case, 16 Ct. CI. 459,
484 (1880), aff'd, 118 U.S. 62 (1886) ("[t]he absolute control of the moneys of the United
States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only
to the people").
36. Geddes v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 428, 444 (1903).
37. United States v. State Bridge Comm'n, 109 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
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the appropriation must be sufficiently indentifiable to make clear the
intent of Congress."8 Congress also has the authority to attach con-
ditions to the use of funds appropriated for particular purposes.3
The first part of the Clause, requiring "appropriation made by
law" before money issues from the Treasury, thus places an impor-
tant responsibility in the Congress, the lawmaking branch of govern-
ment.40 It allows Congress to control policy and to order priorities
within the government as a whole and within each individual agency.
To be effective in this task-to assure that there has been compliance
with the appropriations laws it has passed, and that waste and cor-
ruption have been avoided-Congress would have to check how the
Executive spent the appropriated funds. An accounting requirement
running from the Executive to Congress may therefore be implicit in
the first part of the Clause; Congress has in fact required reports from
the Executive on almost all governmental spending. 41
While there might be argument about a constitutional requirement
that Congress be told how the money was spent, the second part of
the Clause makes it clear that the information is to be released. The
Constitution requires that the statement be "published"-made public
-from time to time.42 While a regular statement would certainly be
38. Id. Thus a blanket appropriation to the Executive for all purposes of govern-
ment, or an appropriation to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with the
provision that OMB had authority to transfer funds to other government agencies, might
be open to challenge.
39. Ohio v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946). In
Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (1945), afJ'd, 154 F.2d 419 (9th
Cir. 1946), the district court wrote:
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority not only to desig-
nate the purpose of the appropriation, but also the terms and conditions under which
the executive department of the government may expend such appropriations....
The purpose of the appropriations, the terms and conditions under which said ap-
propriations were made, is a matter solely in the hands of Congress and it is the
plain and explicit duty of the executive branch of the government to comply with
the same.
But see 50 U.S.C. § 403f (1970):
In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to-
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government Agencies such sums as may be
approved by the Office of Management and Budget, for the performance of any of
the functions or activities authorized under Sections 403 and 405 of this title .... Sums
transferred ... may be expended... without regard to limitations of appropriations
from which transferred...;
and id. § 403j(b):
The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the
provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1951).
41. See pp. 616, 617 infra.
42. That the Framers understood the significance in choosing the word "publish"-.
meaning that the information would go to the people and not only to the Congress-is
clear. Compare U.S. CONsr. art I, § 9, cI. 7 ("a regular Statement and Account... shall be
published"), with id. art. II, § 3 (The President "shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union...').
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useful to a vigilant Congress, simply providing the information to the
legislators is not sufficient. Moreover, the language is precise: The
statement and account are to be "regular," and they must cover "all
public Money." The second part of the Clause, then, was designed to
make congressional responsibility "more perfect" 43 and allow the peo-
ple to check Congress 44 and the Executive through publication of in-
formation on what "money is expended, for what purposes, and by
what authority."
45
Such information is useful for a number of reasons. The most ob-
vious is that it allows the people to see the course of policy as re-
flected in governmental expenditures. The people could then deter-
mine for themselves whether too much money is being spent on de-
fense, and too little on education, or whether too much money is
spent on bombers as opposed to submarines. It allows the people,
jointly with Congress, to determine if the expenditures by the Execu-
tive reflect the intent embodied in the appropriations. The informa-
tion also provides an opportunity for the people to scrutinize ap-
propriations by Congress and expenditures by the Executive to de-
termine if they were for purposes allowed by the Constitution.46
Finally, on a somewhat more mundane level, the information allows
the people, as Story put it, to detect "errors," uncover "misapplica-
tion of funds," and discover "corruption and public peculation," 47
supplementing the efforts of law enforcement officials charged with
unearthing wrongdoing. If the people are dissatisfied with either
43. 2 J. STORY, supra note 34, § 1348, at 222-23.
44. See 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 345 (statement of Chancellor Livingston):
You will give up to your state legislature everything dear and valuable; but you will
give no power to Congress, because it may be abused; you will give them no revenue,
because the public treasures may be squandered. But do you not see here a capital
check? Congress are to publish, from time to time, an account of their receipts and
expenditures. These may be compared together; and if the former, year after year,
exceed the latter, the corruption will be detected, and the people may use the con-
stitutional mode of redress.
45. 2 J. STORY, supra note 34, § 1348, at 222-23. The reporting provision of Article I,
§ 9, Clause 7 might well come within the class of restrictions to which Justice Frankfurter
was referring when he wrote: "The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a
day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of
the restrictions that fenced in even the most disinterested assertions of authority." Youngs-
town Sheet 9- Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1951) (concurring opinion).
46. David Ramsey, one of the early commentators on the Constitution, wrote that if
Congress applied any funds for purposes other than those set forth in the Constitution,
they would have exceeded their powers. The clause provides information so that "[t]he
people of the United States who pay, are to be judges how far their money is properly
applied." Ramsey, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject of the
Federal Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUON OF THE UNITED STATES 374 (P.
Ford ed. 1888). Without such information on expenditures, it would be impossible to
mount the kind of challenge found in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
47. 2 J. STORY, supra note 34, § 1348, at 222-23.
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Congress or the Executive, based on the accounts required to be
published, they will "use the constitutional mode of redress." 48
III. Government Funding and CIA Practices
An examination of appropriations and accounting under Clause 7
since the adoption of the Constitution reveals a continuum of prac-
tices from full disclosure to strict secrecy. The most prevalent funding
practice, however, one which dates from the first Congress, provides
for specific appropriation and disclosure, in some detail, of how the
money was expended. In 1791, the House provided by resolution that
the Secretary of the Treasury bring before the House an "accurate
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public
money," broken down by "each head of appropriation." 4 The text
of the resolution makes clear that the report was to account accurately
for all public money.
Most federal spending currently follows a standard procedureO
which might be described as the full disclosure model. The Executive
proposes a budget for the agency divided into a number of subappro-
priations by the program activities of the agency (the program clas-
sification budget) or by the object of the expenditure, such as per-
sonnel, or travel and transport (the object classification budget). The
budget also provides for funds, if necessary, for plant and capital
equipment. The appropriations committees of Congress then screen
48. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 345 (statement of Chancellor Livingston). It might be
possible to argue that since the ballot is available as a sanction for abuse of the public
treasury by either Congress or the Executive, it could also be used to discipline a Congress
that failed to provide adequate information in the regular statement. Such a view of
congressional accountability, while appealing as a study in direct democracy, ignores the
particular form of checks and balances which the Constitution establishes; under the
Constitution, no plebiscite on each congressional action is required. The Clause represents
a determination by the Framers that certain information should be available to inform
the debate that takes place at the time of elections. If the spending information is dis-
closed, debate focuses on the merits of the spending rather than on the less gripping issue
of a failure to disclose.
The position argued here certainly does not rest on an assumption that every voter will
read the published accounts. Rather the information published there would be available
to those citizens interested in a particular program or item, and through them would
filter into the political process. Such filtering obviously cannot take place if the informa-
tion is shut off at the source, and the public denied information which the Framers
believed they had a right to know.
49. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 302 (1792). The present provision is codified at 31 U.S.C. §
66b, 1029 (1970).
The "heads" of appropriation mentioned in the statute have been defined operationally
for purposes of reporting-they simply are the agencies which have been appropriated
funds and which therefore have a concomitant duty to account. A head of appropriation
is thus a unit of arbitrary size, varying from a small commission to an agency receiving
billions of dollars annually. Special provisions cover appropriations made for confidential
purposes. See p. 617 infra.
50. See generally R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1966).
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the proposed budget, make recommendations, and bring them to the
floor where Congress votes a specific appropriation to the agency.
The resulting expenditures are subject to scrutiny by the congressional
committees charged with substantive responsibility for the agency, by
the Congress as a whole, and by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), which serves as Congress's watchdog agency.51 Expenditures
are described in the Combined Statement,5 2 the comprehensive ac-
count of government spending published pursuant to the require-
ments of the Clause. Proposed and actual appropriations and expendi-
tures are reported in various other government publications,5 3 and
more information is available to the public under the Freedom of
Information Act.
5 4
Since 1793 certain agencies have been appropriated funds specif-
ically for confidential purposes;5 5 these agencies occupy the center of
the disclosure continuum.56 For example, a foreign negotiation which
requires secrecy might be funded from sums specifically appropriated
to the State Department to be used for- confidential purposes. Details
of such expenditures are not published; their expenditure is accounted
for by certification of the department head. 57 The total budgeted for
confidential purposes, as well as the total and details of nonconfi-
dential funds, are still made public.58
51. See 31 U.S.C. § 67 (1970).
52. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES,
AND BALANCES OF THI: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMBINED
S rATEMENT].
53. The most important of these are the OMB's Budget and the Appendix to the
Budget, which are published annually, and which have the appropriations proposed by
the executive. Also available are the congressional hearings on the proposed appropria-
tions, the reports of the congressional committees, and the debates on the floor of
Congress.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974).
55. By the Act of February 9, 1793, Congress provided
that in all cases, where any sum or sums of money have issued, or shall hereafter issue,
from the treasury, for the purposes of intercourse or treaty, the President shall be,
and he hereby is authorized to cause the same to be duly settled annually with the
accounting officers of the Treasury in the manner following, that is to say; by causing
the same to be accounted for, specifically in all instances wherein the expenditures
thereof may, in his judgment be made public; and by making a certificate or certifi-
cates, or causing the Secretary of State to make a certificate or certificates of the
amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every
such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therein
expressed to have been expended.
Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 300, codified as 31 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). That such a
provision should be applied first to foreign negotiations is not surprising, given the al-
most universal concern on the part of the Framers for the integrity of foreign negotiations.
See 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20 at 52; 3 id. at 315-16; 4 id. at 72-73.
56. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) (Dep't of State); 28 U.S.C. § 537 (1970) (Federal
Bureau of Investigation); 42 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1970) (Atomic Energy Comm'n).
57. See notes 55, 56 supra.
58. See, e.g., OMB, APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972, at 625, 860 (1972).
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The practices of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) provide a
current example of this level of disclosure. Not only is the total
budget of the AEC published,5 9 but the published budget also in-
cludes a breakdown for program activities such as "nuclear ma-
terials," "weapons," "reactor development," and "civil applications
of nuclear explosives." 0° Within each of the program activities, the
cost in major categories is set out: for example, in the 1973 budget
for the nuclear weapons program, $400 million was to be spent for
production, $263 million for research and development, and $109
million for testing.61 Also published is the object classification budget 62
and the plant and capital equipment budget. 3 The total budgeted for
"objects of a confidential nature," is likewise made public; it comes
to $100,000, a tiny part of the agency's entire budget.
64
The funding and accounting practices for the CIA are situated at
the secrecy extreme of the continuum. In a pattern which apparently
developed only after World War 11, 15 virtually all of the funds 0
which the CIA receives and expends are treated as confidential-as
if they were for purposes which require secrecy-and the certificate
of the Director serves as a sufficient accounting for their expenditure.67
Unlike the sums appropriated to the AEC and other agencies for
objects of a confidential nature, however, CIA funds do not derive
from a specific appropriation voted by the Congress. Rather the
funds to be used by the CIA are concealed within the appropriations
59. OMB, APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973, at 771 (1973).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 772.
62. Id. at 774.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 771. Sufficient information about the AEC is published in the budget docu-
ments to allow the public to inform itself about relative priorities by comparing appro-
priations for the AEC with appropriations for the Department of Labor, or comparing
spending for nuclear weapons-with spending for peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
Such information is absolutely crucial for evaluation and criticism of policy choices. Enough
information may be available for a determination of whether funds are being expended
for constitutional purposes. The published documents do not make available the vast
quantity of information which would be necessary in order for the people to determine
if congressional intent in, and conditions on, the appropriations have been complied with,
and if extravagance and corruption have been minimized or eliminated; some of the
information necessary for this is available through the provisions of the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974). On the difficulties of such an audit,
see Catch-22, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 1974, at 88.
65. It does not appear that any agency was totally funded through secret transfer of
funds or was completely secret in its accounting for expenditures prior to the end of
World War II. See note 101 infra. At present not only the CIA but also the National
Security Agency (NSA) make no public accounting. See note 144 infra.
66. The only official reference in the budget documents to CIA expenditures in the
last several years has been the publication of appropriations and expenditures for con-
struction. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDI-
TURES, AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 421 (1972).
67. 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1970), quoted in note 39 supra.
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proposed for other agencies in the President's budget proposal. The
intelligence subcommittees of the appropriations committees examine
the budget requests and determine the funding for the CIA. But
neither the amount of the funds made available to the CIA nor
their places of concealment in the budget are systematically disclosed
to the full appropriations committees; there is disagreement over
whether even the intelligence subcommittees of the armed services
committees, which are supposed to monitor CIA activities, have
access to full funding information. 68 After Congress passes the appro-
priations for those other agencies in which CIA funds are concealed,
the funds for the CIA are secretly transferred by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) to the CIA.60 The funds transferred are
later reported as expenditures of the agencies to which the funds were
originally appropriated. 70
Such practices must be judged a prima facie violation of the first
part of the Clause. The CIA receives no specific appropriation; no
clear statement of congressional intent can therefore be found. In-
stead, congressional intent in providing funds to one agency is ac-
tually negated by the transfer of those funds to the CIA without
specific congressional authorization; the statute which provides for
the administration of the CIA explicitly authorizes transfer "without
regard to limitations"71 in the original appropriation, as well as ex-
penditure "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations
relating to the expenditure of Government funds." 72 Congressional
authority to make policy and set priorities through the appropriations
power is severely undercut.
The auditing procedure suggested by the second part of the Clause
is also abrogated. Neither Congress nor the public can determine
whether the expenditures comply with the CIA's enabling laws, 73
68. Compare 117 CON,. REc. 42924 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Symington), and N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1974, at I, col. 8; Dec. 27, 1974, at 37, col. 1; Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 1, col.
5, with Lyman Kirkpatrick Talks About the CIA, BROWN ALUMNI MONTHLY, Nov. 1974,
at 23, 29 [hereinafter cited as Kirkpatrick].
69. 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970), quoted in note 5 supra.
70. Brief for Appellee (United States Government) at 3-4, Richardson v. United States,
465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
71. 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970), quoted in note 39 supra. If such a provision is valid, any
congressional restriction on spending could be circumvented by transfer of both the funds
and the responsibility for the activity to the CIA. See, e.g., Second Supplemental Appro-
priations Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 129 (no Defense Dep't funds may,
after Aug. 15, 1973, be used for combat activities in Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and
South Vietnam, or adjacent waters).
72. 50 U.S.C. -103j(b) (1970), quoted in note 39 supra.
73. For example, it was revealed in the press that the CIA had assisted with the train-
ing of local police in violation of the injunction in the National Security Act of 1947, §
102(d)(3), 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1970), against the CIA's involvement in domestic security
operations. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1; MARCH=In & MARKS, supra note 4, at
224-25. The concern with the possibility of CIA involvement in domestic affairs was clearly
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or with the Constitution,74 and whether they have been made without
waste 75 or corruption.70 Neither Congress nor the public can weigh
CIA spending against that of other agencies; the CIA's internal or-
dering of priorities cannot be analyzed. Because the funds transferred
to the CIA can come from any government agency,77 the Congress and
the public cannot with assurance accept the account covering any gov-
ernment agency as the regular statement and account the Constitution
requires.
The system might be more palatable (even though its prima facie
unconstitutionality would not be affected) if the public could have
greater confidence in the virtual delegation to the appropriations
subcommittees and the OMB of the authority to appropriate funds,78
and to the armed services subcommittees of the task of overseeing the
CIA's activities. Substantial evidence has surfaced in recent years,
however, that the congressional subcommittees and committees in-
demonstrated at the hearings on the National Security Act of 1947. Representative Brown
told the House Armed Services Committee,
I would want to make certain that the activities and functions of the Central In-
telligence Agency were carefully confined to international matters, to military matters,
and to matters of national security. We have enough people running around butting
into everybody's business in this country without establishing another agency to do it.
What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of the present snoopers instead of
adding to them.
Congressman Dorn added,
The Central Intelligence Agency is primarily concerned and almost entirely con-
cerned with intelligence pertaining to military and foreign matters. I tell you, the
crowd you have to worry about is the FBI and Tom Clark.
Hearings on the National Security Act of 1947 Before the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 438-39 (1947). As a result of this concern the National
Security Act of 1947 forbids the CIA from exercising any "police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions." On the secrecy of CIA domestic operations, see
MARCHETrI & MARKS, supra note 4, at 224-29; N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 1, at I, col. 1.
It has also been alleged that the CIA was engaged in a massive domestic intelligence
operation, including surveillance of members of Congress and the Supreme Court. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 25, 1974, at I, col. 8; Dec. 29, 1974, § I,
at I, col. 1; Dec. 30, 1974, at 1, col. 3; Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1974, at A 1, col. 6, 8; Rattling
Skeletons in the CIA Closet, Tmm, Jan. 6, 1975, at 44.
74. See Appellant's Brief at 4, A12, Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.
1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
75. See A. TuLLY, THE SUPER Seis 232 (1969); 117 CONG. REc. 40283-84, 42923-26 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. Symington). See generally MARCHErI & MARKS, supra note 4, at 58-59,
96-101, 278 (1974).
76. See MARCHE-ri & MARKS, supra note 4, at 147.
77. See 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970). Lyman Kirkpatrick has suggested, however, that the
CIA's funds are hidden in the procurement section of the Department of Defense ap-
propriation. Interview with Lyman Kirkpatrick, former CIA Executive Director-Comp-
troller, in Bristol, R.I., Dec. 6, 1973 (tape of interview on file with the Yale Law Journal).
See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
78. See 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970). It is useful to remember what Justice Brennan wrote
in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 259, 276 (1967) (concurring opinion);
Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the
electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards,
this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or
responsive in the same degree to the people... "Without explicit action by lawmakers,
decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to
administrators, who, under our system of government, are not endowed with authority
to decide them." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507.
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volved have been ineffective in exercising their supervisory au-
thority.70 The thoroughness of the OMB's monitoring has been sub-
jected to similar criticism. 0
IV. Possible Means of Reconciling the CIA Funding
Practice with the Clause
The current CIA funding practices clash with the apparent re-
quirements of the Clause. Nonetheless, there are several theories
79. The subcommittees do not have the assistance of the GAO to help monitor all CIA
expenditures, but "[i]ntelligence officials insist ... that... funds are audited just as strin-
gently." H. RANSOM, THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT 87 (1970). President Eisenhower
told Allen Dulles to make sure that CIA internal auditing procedures were even more
searching than those of the GAO, A. DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE 259 (1963). A
1955 Hoover Commission study noted, however, that the lack of outside surveillance
raised "the possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosure of
costs, organization, personnel, and functions are precluded by Law." Quoted in H.
RANSOM, supra, at 161.
Senator Symington, a member of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee, has strongly criticized its work. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1974, at 1, col. 8;
117 CONG. REc. 42924-26 (1971). Symington noted that the subcommittee had not met at
all in 1971. Id. at 42931. The subcommittee has met twice this year. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1974, § 4, at 1, col. 5. Representative Norblad, a former member of the Intelligence Sub-
committee of the Armed Services Committee, stated that it met annually for two hours.
D. WISE & T. Ross, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 265 (1964). That subcommittee met six
times in 1974. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 1, col. 5. See generally N.Y. Times, Dec.
27, 1974, at 37, col. 1; Dec. 10, 1974, at 15, col. 1; MARCHETrI & MARKS, supra. note 4, at
323, 342. It should be noted that in the future the House Foreign Affairs Committee will
share jurisdiction over foreign policy related activities of the CIA. Wash. Post, Dec. 24,
1974, at A 9, col. 8.
If the supervision by the armed services subcommittees is cursory, the burden of con-
gressional supervision falls on the intelligence subcommittees of the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees. The appropriations subcommittee in the Senate is made up
of the most senior members of the Committee; the membership of the subcommittee in
the House is secret. R. FENNO, supra note 50, at 131 n.6. MARCHETTI & MARKS, supra, at
345-47, criticize the procedures of the appropriations subcommittees and note that in
1967 the CIA did not even appear before the budgetary oversight subcommittees. The
Senate subcommittee met five times this year. N.Y. 1 fmes, Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
One exchange on the floor of the Senate calls into question that subcommittee's work. In
response to Symington's criticism of CIA activities in Laos and to Cranston's questions,
it was revealed by Ellender that neither he nor the Intelligence Subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee had known anything about the CIA's employment of
mercenaries in Laos before reports appeared in the press. After reading the reports, neither
sought further information from the CIA. 177 CONG. REc. 42929-31 (1971).
Lyman Kirkpatrick, who strongly disagrees with Senator Symington's assessment of the
amount of control exercised over the CIA, MARCHErI 321, nonetheless has suggested that
effective oversight by Congress would require two or three working days per month. L.
KIRKPATRICK, THE REAL CIA 273 (1968). See generally P. MCGARVEY, THE CIA 216 (1972).
There is some question as to the ability of Congress to supervise the CIA, no matter how
much time is spent, when it is not clear that the CIA Director will always respond candidly
to questions posed by members of Congress. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1974, at 14, col. 3;
MARCHETrI & MAlus, supra, at 228-29.
80. In the absence of any chccking by the GAO, the OMB might supplement the
internal audits of the CIA. The OMB, however, has only five employees monitoring the
budgets and expenditures of the entire intelligence community, of whom only one ex-
aminer (along with the branch chief) scrutinizes the CIA's budget. MARCHETri & MARKS,
supra note 4, at 336. But see Kirkpatrick, supra note 68, at 29. Richard Helms, former
Director of the CIA, has maintained that the budget is gone over line-by-line by the
OMB. MARCHErI & MARKS, supra, at 339. Marchetti and Marks, however, describe the
OMB as usually "indulgent" to the CIA; they allege that the CIA works hard at con-
cealing its activities and any surplus funds from the OMB. Id. at 62, 337-39.
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which Congress and the Executive might use to argue that the prac-
tices satisfy the Clause. Room might be found within the phrase
"from time to time." Congress's authority over the detail to be in-
cluded in the Combined Statement might authorize the practice.
The secrecy might find some support in Congress's acknowledged
power to withhold certain proceedings from publication in its journals,
or it might be considered a longstanding practice and therefore pre-
sumed constitutional. This section evaluates each of these conten-
tions and finds them wanting.
A. "From Time to Time"
One line of justification asserts that the Framers' choice of the
phrase "from time to time"8' in place of a requirement for annual
publication was designed to provide secrecy for sensitive expenditures.
Under this theory, such expenditures would be revealed as the need
for secrecy disappeared.
In the debates on Clause 7, the need for secrecy was mentioned
briefly. At the Virginia Convention, Mason, who had fought for
annual statements, stated that the need for secrecy was among the
reasons which had been suggested for the adoption of the ambiguous
phrase "from time to time."182 He did not indicate who had sug-
gested this reason nor do the recorded debates note any such sug-
gestion. Mason and other opponents of "from time to time" did
fear that the "looseness" of the phrase might allow a decision not
to publish any account. It might "afford opportunities of misapplying
the public money, and sheltering those who did it" by allowing ex-
penditures to be "concealed forever."83 Madison argued against Ma-
son's position not because of the need for secrecy but because
if the account of the public receipts and expenditures were to
be published at short stated periods, they would not be so full and
connected as would be necessary for a thorough comprehension
of them, and detection of any errors. But by giving them an op-
portunity of publishing them from time to time, as might be
found easy and convenient, they would be more full and satis-
factory to the public, and would be sufficiently frequent.
8 4
81. This phrase was used several times in the C6nstitution, and has come to represent
different time intervals. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 5, cl. 3 (providing for the journals of
Congress); id. art. II, § 3 (providing for the State of the Union message). The COMBINED
STATEMENT, supra note 52, published pursuant to Clause 7 and to 31 U.S.C. §§ 66b, 1029
(1970) is issued annually, as is the State of the Union Message; a daily edition of the
Congressional Record is available.
82. D. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 326.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 326-27.
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If the need for secrecy were indeed the reason for adopting Madi-
son's phrase, it is striking that such a need was not raised in the
debates by any of the proponents; they suggested that the phrase
meant short, convenient intervals,8 5 and they justified it on the
basis that it would provide fuller information to the public. The
proponents appear to have agreed with Mason, who stated that he
did not "conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public
money ought ever to be concealed." 80 Basing the decision never to
reveal CIA expenditures on the phrase "from time to time," then,
would run counter to the explanations of the phrase offered at the
conventions by its supporters, and would confirm the worst fears
of the opponents of the phrase, fears that were dismissed by the
proponents as groundless.8 7 It would also ignore the fact that the
phrase has since been determined by Congress uniformly to require
other agencies to report annually.
B. Congressional Control over the Form and
Content of the Accounts
It has been argued that Congress has plenary power over the form
and content of the accounts 8 and could decide therefore to provide
no information on the expenditures of the CIA. This argument seems
to read the Clause as relating only to a division of power between
the Congress and the Executive. Perhaps the first part of the Clause
has that purpose; it places the appropriations power squarely in the
Congress and implies reporting by the Executive to Congress. But
the second part requires that a regular statement be published-pre-
sented to the public. It was designed to allow the people to check not
only the Executive but also the Congress.8 9 If Congress possessed ab-
solute authority over the inclusion or exclusion of information, this
check would be rendered meaningless.
85. See note 22 supra.
86. D. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 326.
87. See note 22 supra. It might be possible to argue that, while reports of CIA ex-
penditures need not be withheld forever, they might constitutionally be withheld
for a period which would ensure that their revelation would not damage the national
security, e.g., for a period of 10, 15, or 20 years. While such a practice might be justified
under an expansive interpretation of "from time to time," it finds no support in the de-
bates and there are serious questions whether the publication of expenditures, either in
lump sum or in detail, poses any reasonable threat to national security. See pp. 632-33
infra.
88. Although we do not reach or decide precisely what is meant by a regular state-
ment or account, it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting
and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interests.
United States v. Richardson, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2947 n.11 (1974).
89. Sce notes 43-45 supra; United States v. Richardson, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2956 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Yale Law Journal
While the Framers did not describe in detail what the regular
statements were to include, the debates do indicate that the reports
were to be "full," "not too general," connected enough for a "thorough
comprehension," but not so detailed as to be "impracticable." ' 0 No
mention was made of Congress's power simply to exclude an agency
from the reports.
Congress therefore does have some power over the content and
form of the accounts. But to provide almost no information what-
soever on the expenditures of a large and important agency is hardly
a mere decision on detail; especially when inclusion would be prac-
ticable and would increase comprehensibility, and when the transfer
procedures make suspect all other reported expenditures.
C. Congressional Control over the Journals
The Constitution provides that each house keep "a Journal of its
Proceedings and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . ."91 Since Con-
gress thus has the power to withhold from the public the congres-
sional debates on the matters for which money is being appropriated,
some have suggested that it would be inconsistent to assume an in-
tention on the part of the Framers to provide an absolute obligation
to publish every expenditure. 92 But the two constitutional provisions
are not equivalent. 93 There is an explicit provision for secrecy in
the Journal Clause;94 there is no such provision in the Statement
90. See note 18 & p. 622 supra.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
92. Appellant's Brief to the Supreme Court at 24-25, United States v. Richardson, 94
S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
93. In the course of the Virginia debates, Madison did imply that the journal was to
include the statement of accounts. See note 96 infra. Patrick Henry apparently also be-
lieved that the regular statement would be included in the journal. He opposed the wide
exception to publication in the journal and the ambiguity of "from time to time" be-
cause these provisions would "allow the national wealth.., to be disposed of under the
veil of secrecy." 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 462.
The Constitution is not explicit as to whether the accounts must be published in the
journal or in a separate document. Under the Articles of Confederation a journal was
published monthly; until publication ceased, the accounts were published semi-annually.
Given the differences in history and in content, and the fact that the provisions for a
journal and a regular statement appear in different sections of the Constitution, the ap-
parent belief of some of the Founders that one would include the other does not compel a
conclusion that the Constitution requires inclusion nor that the journal secrecy was
meant to apply to the accounts. Moreover, Congress has consistently provided for separate
publications.
94. The congressional power to withhold the debates from publication was discussed
thoroughly during the discussions on Article I, § 5, clause 3. The original proposal made
no provision for journal secrecy. After the broad secrecy provision ultimately passed was
added, there were several unsuccessful attempts to narrow the exception to one similar
to that provided in the Articles of Confederation, article IX. See 2 RrcoRDs, supra note
9, at 180, 260; 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 403.
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and Account Clause. Rather the latter clause emphasizes regular ac-
counting of all public money. The difference in plain language would
seem to be a strong argument against this ground for nondisclosure
of CIA expenditures.
In addition, the proceedings of Congress which were to be re-
ported in the journal contained discussions of foreign negotiations
and alliances, treaties not yet come to maturity, and possible military
operations, the revelation of which the Framers feared.95 The Framers
believed that the amount of detail which was to be included and
which was necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the regular
statement was established would not compromise these vital interests.96
D. Longstanding Practice
It might also be suggested that the CIA's funding secrecy cannot
be called into question because it is a practice of long standing. Long-
standing practice is not, in itself, a justification for practices which
are unconstitutional.97 Rather longstanding practice provides a "gloss"
which aids in the interpretation of the Constitution;98 longtime ac-
ceptance of a practice without attack may establish a form of pre-
sumption of the constitutionality of the practice.99 Since the funding
and budget disclosure provisions for the CIA have gone unchallenged
from 1947 until recently, it might be contended that their constitu-
tionality is presumed. However, 27 years hardly mean that the prac-
tice is sufficiently well established to claim the benefit of the doc-
95. See 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 52; 3 id. at 315-16; 4 id. at 72-73; D. ROBERTSON,
supra note 20, at 236; cf. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
96. A speech by Madison to the Virginia Convention supports this conclusion. Defend-
ing the journal secrecy provision, he stated that "the policy of not divulging the most
important transactions, and negotiations of nations, such as those which relate to warlike
arrangements and treaties, is universally admitted." D. RoBERTsoN, supra note 20, at 236.
He assured the Convention, however, that, "the Congressional proceedings are to be
occasionally published, including all receipts and expenditures of public money, of which
no part can be used, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Id. (emphasis
in original). He thereby implied that, despite possible inclusion in the journals, the con-
stitutionally required accounts would not fall within the secrecy exception. See p. 623
supra.
97. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
98. Id. at 610-11.
99. As Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Not controlling, but surely not unimportant are nearly two centuries of acceptance of
a reading of cl. 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of
precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expendi-
ture of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive
public reporting.
United States v. Richardson, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2947 n.l1 (1974).
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trine, 100 especially when compared to the practice of disclosure which
dates from 1791.
One might still respond that the practices of the CIA are simply
examples, albeit somewhat more extreme, of congressional provisions
for confidential expenditures. Since 1793 details of expenditures from
appropriations made for confidential purposes have been withheld,
but Congress always made a specific appropriation, and such appro-
priations were never for the entire budget of an agency. In many
cases, information on the use made of those funds has been revealed
shortly after the expenditure,10' or if withheld, would be available
to Congress under certain conditions. 0 2 CIA practice thus departs too
drastically from earlier practices to claim them as precedent.0 3
100. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611, 613
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., D. MILLER, SECRET STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) (discussion of
funds secretly, but specifically, appropriated in 1811 and 1812 which were used for the oc-
cupation of Florida; the use of these funds was revealed in 1818). The most famous ex-
ample of secret funding was the Manhattan Project. Details of the arrangements to fund
the development of the atomic bomb were revealed immediately after World War II. See L.
GROVES, Now IT CAN BE TOLD 361 (1962). In the case of the Manhattan Project funds were
provided through appropriations to "Engineering Service: Army" and "Expediting Pros-
ecution of the War Effort" with the true use of funds known only to the congressional
leadership. Representatives Martin, Rayburn, and McCormack, apparently withott statu-
tory authority, agreed to a plan whereby they would be given advance notice of the
Manhattan Project's funding requirements and the places in the budget where the funds
would be concealed. Selected members of the appropriations committees were to be told
that these budget items had been discussed with the Secretary of War and should not be
questioned. Id. at 360, 363. Other committee members and the other members of Congress
would only be given general information about these items.
The large expenditures in "Engineering Service: Army" and "Expediting Prosecution of
the War Effort" did not entirely escape congressional notice. A Special Senate Committee
on the National Defense, headed by Harry S. Truman, sought to investigate them, but
agreed to postpone the investigation until security permitted. Id. at 365.
Senator Millard Tydings remembered the funding in a different way. "General Marshall
came before the Appropriations Committee one day and said in effect this:
Gentlemen, I want you to give me a billion dollars. I do not want you to ask me
what it is going to be used for. It is a military secret, but I hope you will give me
the money."
The Committee responded, to the recollection of Tydings, by asking whether a billion
dollars would be enough. Hearings on the National Security Act Before the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 623 (1947).
While appropriations for the Project were concealed from Congress and the people, the
justification offered was that concealment was a wartime necessity, preventing German
discovery of our development of this new weapon. See note 130 infra. The project was
under Army supervision; the funds were thus never transferred to a separate agency. The
funds were a small part of the Army budget-a budget which was available even in war-
time. Finally, as the Comptroller General told the Senate Special Committee on Atomic
Energy, he and his staff had audited or were auditing every single penny expended on
the Project. L. GROVES, supra at 361.
102. For example, details of expenditures by Daniel Webster from a discretionary
fund were made available to the Senate by former President Tyler in 1846, when such
expenditures came under investigation. See Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege: The
President Won't Tell, in NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA 56
(N. Dorsen & S. Gillers ed. 1974).
103. It might also be argued that congressional practice since 1791 has been to ap-
propriate money to, and require reports from, separate heads of appropriation (see note
49 supra). As the CIA does not constitute a head of appropriation-is not appropriated
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V. The National Security Justification
The preceding section has demonstrated that alternative interpre-
tations which would reconcile present CIA funding practices with
Clause 7 are simply not convincing. Nonetheless, the requirements of
the Clause are not absolute; if fulfilling them would endanger the
national security, they would have to yield or at least be redefined.
But the mere fact that national security is invoked does not close
the question. 04 In the past when national security claims have been
raised in support of particular congressional actions, the Court has
not allowed them simply to override, without analysis, constitutional
requirements or guarantees; 105 the claims have been analyzed using
various tests which the courts have fashioned.10 6
funds-it might be argued that the requirement for an account broken down by each
separate head of appropriation does not apply to it. Under this interpretation, the funds
which it receives are accounted for sufficiently under the expenditures reported by the
agency which originally received the appropriation.
If this mechanical reading of the longstanding practice were to prevail, Congress could
by statute reduce reporting to a single head, i.e., appropriate all funds to the OMB
and have all funds reported as expended by the OMB. This would satisfy the congres-
sional requirement for accounting by head of appropriation, but it would probably
violate the first part of the Clause, and it would render the second part of the Clause
meaningless. The "head of appropriation" requirement would be applied more logically
if the CIA were required to report as a "functional" head of appropriation because
money, through not appropriated to it, is set aside and transferred to it.
104. The importance of the Clause should not be minimized even when national
security interests are involved. Justice Stewart wrote:
In the absence of the governmental checks present in other areas of our national
life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the area of na-
tional defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (concurring opinion).
105. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
106. The courts have not settled on any one test; even where arguable individual
rights have been at issue, court treatment has ranged from demanding inquiry to an
almost passive acceptance of the government's claim of a national security threat. Compare
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order."),
with Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding passport restrictions against travel to
certain countries as supported by the "weightiest considerations of national security,"
with little further analysis). Of the latter decision, recent commentary noted that "[t]he
Court... failed to analyze carefully those [considerations]. Such an analysis would have
revealed that rather limited foreign policy interests are served by the system of area
restrictions." Note, Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1149 (1972).
A recent revision of the classification guidelines illustrates subtle but important dif-
ferences in standards that could be used. The previous system authorized top secret
classification for material "the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in excep-
tionally grave danger to the Nation..." Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 115 (Supp. 1953),
18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953) (emphasis added). The new test is "whether ... unauthorized
disclosure [of the information] could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave
danger to the national security." Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974) (emphasis
added). Examples of "exceptionally grave danger" are provided in both Executive Orders.
The latter lists: "armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of
foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital defense
627
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 608, 1975
In United States v. Robel, 0 7 the Court was called upon to assess
the constitutional validity of a congressional act which its proponents
justified on the grounds of national security. It found the act uncon-
stitutional; Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, summed
up the test:
[W]e have confined our analysis to whether Congress has adopted
a constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate legis-
lative goal. In making this determination we have found it neces-
sary to measure the validity of the means adopted by Congress
against both the goal it has sought and the specific prohibitions
of the First Amendment .... We have ruled only that the Con-
stitution requires that the conflict between congressional power
and individual rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more
narrowly to avoid the conflict.108
Robel involved First Amendment rights. But one need not be-
lieve that the Clause has the preeminent status accorded the First
Amendment, nor that the rights it grants are individual rights, in
order to accept a test similar to Robel's for analyzing apparent vio-
lations. The Clause sets forth a clear constitutional requirement in
plain language in the text of Article I. Congress should be expected,
in the legislation it passes, to minimize potential conflict with ex-
plicit provisions of the Constitution, whether those provisions be
found in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere. It therefore makes sense
plans or complex cryptographic and communications intelligence operations; and the
isclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security." Id. For
a discussion of the justiciability of such standards, see Nimmer, National Security Secrets V.
Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 328
n.80 (1974).
The important variables in any test are therefore the seriousness of the expected effects
of disclosure and the likelihood that disclosure will have such a result. A related question
involves the respective roles of the courts and the Executive in assessing both likelihood
and seriousness. See New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, at 757 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) ("In my judgment the judiciary may not properly ... redetermine for itself the
probable impact of disclosure on the national security.'). But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1974, at 21, col. 3 (1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act mandate court
review of executive classification decisions).
Under a loose test of the national security claim-for example, whether revealing the
information could conceivably have some negative impact on national security-even
budget information on the interstate highway system could be withheld. Government
expenditures on interstate highways have an arguable effect on national security. See
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, ch. 462, § 108(a), 70 Stat. 378 ("Because of its primary
importance to the national defense, the name of such system is hereby changed to the
'National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.' ")
Given the purposes of the Clause, any standard which allowed such secrecy could not
be tolerated. This Note recommends a standard based upon consequences one "could
reasonably expect"; concealment via appropriation for confidential purposes should not
be allowed unless the expected risk is substantial, and courts should not rest solely upon
executive assertion but should examine the circumstances themselves.
107. 389 U.S. 259 (1967).
108. Id. at 268 n.20.
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to give detailed consideration, as Robel did, to the exact goal Con-
gress has sought, the ways in which the act in question is supposed
to serve the goal, the impact the act has on constitutional requirements,
and possible alternatives for achieving the congressional goal.
By establishing the CIA, Congress sought to promote the gathering
of foreign intelligence information, a concededly valid legislative
goal. The agency is to advise the National Security Council on in-
telligence matters, to correlate and evaluate intelligence materials
for the Council, and to perform other intelligence-related tasks.10 9
What must be examined is how the funding arrangements are related
to the accomplishment of that goal, for their effect on the constitu-
tional requirements of the Clause is clear: The appropriations re-
quirement and the reporting requirement are both violated, to the
point where they are almost rendered meaningless. An examination
of the legislative history of the CIA Act" 0 may make it clear why
Congress enacted these funding provisions, exactly what aims it sought
to secure, whether alternatives were considered, and how Congress
interpreted the requirements of the Clause.
The first legislative provisions for the CIA were provided by the
National Security Act of 1947.111 Secrecy for the CIA budget was
touched upon at two points in the congressional hearings. Allen Dulles
recommended a separate appropriation for the CIA as well as a pro-
vision for supplemental funding from other agencies in order to carry
out special operations. It might be inferred that secret funds for
these operations would be desirable, but he did not urge a completely
secret budget. 1 2 Later in the hearings an officer of the Reserve Of-
ficer's Association recommended a classified, budget.1 3 Congress did
not act on either recommendation; it waited two years to provide
an administrative blueprint for the CIA.
The 1949 bill provided for secret funding by transfer from other
agencies. The Congress was told that almost all of the provisions of
the bill already existed for other government agencies and were
merely being extended, 1 4 but no precedent for the funding or re-
109. 50 U.S.C. A 403 (1970).
110. Id. It is difficult to feel confident about any analysis of the CIA's legislative history
due to the amount of material still classified. It has been alleged that certain secret pro-
tocols about the CIA were agreed to in 1947. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1974, at 46, col. 4.
111. Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, § 102, 61 Stat. 497.
112. Hearings on S. 758 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 528 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Nat'l Defense Hearings].
113. Id. at 550.
114. 95 CONG. REC. 1944 (remarks of Rep. Sasscer), 1948 (remarks of Rep. Vinson)
(1949). The principal exception, the one power which apparently was being given the CIA
alone, was the authority to admit a limited number of aliens without regard to the
immigration laws. See id. at 1945 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
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porting provisions was set forth in the hearings, reports, or floor de-
bates.
1 15
The debates in the House made clear that the funding provisions
had been in use since the CIA's creation without congressional au-
thorization,"16 that the CIA Act would "legalize" this method of
funding,117 that such a method was the only way to operate the agency
efficiently without impairing security,1 8 and that it would not be
"wise" to disclose the CIA's budget." 9 No one suggested the existence
of a constitutional requirement to publish appropriations and expendi-
tures; the possibility of publishing parts of the CIA's budget was not
raised.
Discussion of the funding arrangements was more extensive in
the Senate, 20 though the floor managers were very concerned that
too much information was being made public in the debate.' 2 ' One
Senator questioned the bypassing of the traditional procedure of mak-
ing specific appropriations to specific agencies;' 22 he was assured that
while such procedures were fitting for normal governmental func-
tions, if they were followed for the CIA they might result in the
capture and death of CIA agents.' 23 The Senate was told that every
115. Most of the hearings were in executive session. The unclassified sections of the
hearings do not aid the analysis. As Chairman Vinson put it:
We will just have to tell the House they will have to accept our judgment and we
cannot answer a great many questions that might be asked. We cannot have a Central
Intelligence Agency if you are going to advertise it and all of its operations from
the tower-what is the big building in New York?
Congressman Short: "The Empire State."
Hearings on H.R. 1741, H.R. 2546 & H.R. 2663 Before the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 26, at 487 (1949). The House committee report only
summarized the bill's provisions for fear of compromising security. H.R. RIEP. No. 160,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
The failure to provide detailed explanations caused considerable controversy. Repre-
sentative Marcantonio told the House that
the Committee informs us through its report that the Members of the House must
pass this bill without any explanation of all its provisions. This makes every single
section of the bill suspect .... There has never been and there can never be any
justification, at any time, for the representatives of the people ... to abdicate their
functions.
95 CONe. REC. 1946 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Marcantonio).
The most similar previous funding arrangement, that for the Manhattan Project, see
note 101 supra, was not cited as precedent for the funding arrangements, although it was
raised briefly in other contexts. See 95 CONG. REC. 1947 (remarks of Rep. Marcantonio &
Rep. Short), 6955 (remarks of Sen. M. Tydings) (1949).




120. See id. at 6955 (remarks of Sen. McKellar & Sen. M. Tydings).
121. Id. at 6952 (remarks of Sen. M. Tydings).
122. Id. at 6955 (remarks of Sen. McKellar).
123. Id. (remarks of Sen. M. Tydings). Senator Tydings's remarks seem directed not at
budgetary disclosure or specific appropriations, but rather at disclosure of personnel or
the public availability of pay vouchers.
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democratic safeguard was being put around the CIA.' 24
The bill passed and was signed by the President. The failure of
the congressional committees to provide detailed information on the
legislation, the absence of cited precedents for the funding provisions,
and the lack of discussion about the requirement for an accounting-
all create considerable uncertainty whether Congress carefully ana-
lyzed the requirements of national security, the procedures necessary
for the successful operation of the CIA, and the commands of the
Clause.
The one reason plainly asserted for the provision was the safety of
American intelligence agents.'25 But the necessity of guaranteeing the
safety of covert agents should not lead one to ignore the fact that a large
majority of the estimated 16,500 employees of the CIA work in the
United States. 26 Moreover, even during the immediate post-war period
the vast bulk of the intelligence collected was obtained from overt
sources.' 27 Although other goals were not mentioned in the reported
congressional deliberations on the CIA Act, the provisions might have
been enacted to protect the security of CIA tactical operations, 12  to
prevent disclosure of past operations, 129 or to keep secure technological
advances such as the development of new weapons."
30
124. Id. Senator Tydings also told the Senate:
I think it is a question whether or not the law is being winked at unless this bill
is written into law. It is written to effect a cure. It is a question as to whether we
have the authority to act. In my opinion we have not the authority, but nobody is
going to raise the question.
Id. It appears that until William Richardson filed his first suit, no one did question the
authority. See Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
125. 95 CoNG. REC. 6949 (1949) (remarks of Sen. M. Tydings); cf. Exec. Order No.
11,652, § 5(B)(4), 3 C.F.R. 339, 345 (1974). On the effectiveness and reliability of secret
agents, see INARCHLTrI & 'MARKS, supra note 4, at 23, 206-08. With this one exception,
Congress did not set out clearly what interests it sought to protect by using those special
procedures of the CIA Act. It would have been desirable for Congress to set out the
interests to be protected, the alternative forms of disclosure available, the implications of
each, and the tradeoffs involved. See generally United States v.. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346,
350-51 (8th Cir. 1972); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stand-
ards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
126. NIARC-TI & MARKS, swpra note 4, at 61.
127. Nat'l Defense Hearings, supra note 112, at 121.
128. The secrecy of tactical operations raises more difficult questions than the need to
preserve agents' lives. Sonic critics have argued that there is no effective control of the
intelligence agencies and that they function as an "invisible government." See D. WIsE
& T. Ross, supra note 79. Other critics have not gone so far but have pointed to a lack
of effective congressional control. See note 79 supra. In either case it is possible to argue
that more public disclosure and discussion of the CIA's tactical operations is the only
way to control the tendency toward improper covert operations-a tendency which, it is
claimed, is demonstrated by the CIA's role in Watergate. See MARCHEzrI & MARKs, supra
note 4, at 249-50.
129. The revelation of past activities might compromise present sources, prevent similar
tactics being used again, or damage relations with the country or countries involved.
130. On the principal example of such secrecy, the Manhattan Project to develop the
atomic bomb, see note 101 supra. When overall military strategy is based on deterrence,
there are powerful arguments for revealing at least the existence of new weapons as they
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The present practices admittedly protect these interests, but they
are not the only means for doing so; there are alternatives that would
serve. The most obvious alternatives involve barring future undis-
closed transfers from other agency budgets, appropriating the CIA's
funds, either in lump sum or in detail, and including CIA expendi-
tures, again either in lump sum or in detail, in the Combined State-
ment.131 The impact of the alternatives on the interests Congress
sought to protect is clear. It is nearly impossible to conceive of any
scenario in which open lump-sum appropriation to the CIA and an
accounting for the gross sum expended by the agency would sub-
stantially enhance any danger to these interests. There are too many
links in the long chain between a figure as large as the estimated
5750 million the CIA spent in 1973132 and the particulars an enemy
might want to know-the whereabouts of an agent, the details of
tactics, even the broad outlines of strategy.' 33 Although any such
judgment involves elements of speculation, 34 it is instructive to note
are developed. For example, the Navy has sought publicity, in order to enhance deterrent
-alue, for a new form of torpedo mine developed secretly, but the State and Defense
Departments have urged secrecy for fear that the United States will be charged with a
violation of the Seabed Treaty of 1972. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1974, at 16, col. 5.
131. In 1971, Senator George S. McGovern introduced S. 2231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The bill provided that a single sum covering proposed appropriations and expenditures
of the CIA be shown in the budget of the United States. Id. § I. It also provided that no
funds appropriated to any other department or agency could be made available for ex-
penditure by the CIA. Id. § 2. The single figure would "allow the Congress to exercise its
constitutional powers over Federal finances," but would not "endanger national security"
by communicating "usable information to potential adversaries." 117 CONG. REc. 23692
(1971) (remarks of Sen. McGovern). The bill died in the Armed Services Committee.
132. 119 CONG. REC. S6868 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); MAR-
CHETTs & MARKS, supra note 4, at 59.
133. Even strong supporters of the CIA have maintained that neither the CIA nor
national security would be harmed by disclosure of its aggregate budget. Interview with
Lyman Kirkpatrick, supra note 77; Interview with Elliot Richardson, former Sec'y of
Defense, in New Haven, Conn., Apr. 2, 1974. As Allen Dulles noted, the withholding of
too much information may hurt the CIA, since certain information must be given out
if public confidence in the intelligence mission is to be strengthened. See A. DULLES, supra
note 79, at 8. This view is, of course, not unanimously held; for example, Clay White-
head, former Director of Telecommunications Policy of the Executive Office of the
President, feels that revealing even the aggregate budget of the CIA would enable other
nations to determine our intelligence capabilities. Interview with Clay Whitehead in
New Haven, Conn., Mar. 26, 1974.
134. It is possible to argue that people outside of the CIA, not having access to secret
information, cannot evaluate the impact of change on the agency or national security.
Such an argument cannot be answered fully. It asks that ideas not be tested in the
marketplace but that they be accepted on the basis of unchallengeable authority. So it
is with secrecy. It is obviously difficult to define what should be kept secret in order not
to impair the national security without knowing what is presently kept secret and why;
the act of definition of the interests to be protected may in itself threaten national
sectrity. Among the facts which are currently being withheld on the basis of national
security are: the executive order establishing the National Security Agency (NSA) in
1952, D. KAHN, THE CODE BREAKERS 675 (1967); the existence of the National Reconnais-
sance Office which spends over a billion dollars a year, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1973, at A9,
col. 8; the number of Secret Service agents who were guarding the recently resigned Vice
President, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1974, at 21, col. 1; the reasons for the surveillance of
former President Nixon's brother, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 25, col. 1.
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that aggregate budget figures for a related agency, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, have been made known without any hint that such
publication has caused significant national security problems. 135
The present funding and disclosure practices thus cannot be jus-
tified by invoking national security. They are unconstitutional and
should be replaced. The Constitution requires, at a minimum, lump-
sum appropriation and accounting, and an end to secret transfer of
funds. Implementing these measures would prevent the funding and
disclosure practices from clashing so blatantly with the requirements
of the Clause. But if nothing beyond lump-sum appropriations by
Congress and revelations of aggregate expenditures is accomplished,
it may well be asked just how much has been gained. The achieve-
ment is small, but an achievement nonetheless. Possessing such in-
formation, the public-and Congress-could more accurately assess
the nation's spending priorities, measuring the CIA's claim on the
public treasury against other national endeavors. The public and
the Congress would also have a notion of the level of CIA activity
from year to year. Congress would have to live up to its constitutional
responsibility of determining policy and priorities; forcing Congress
as a whole to appropriate funds to the agency would mean that it
could no longer pass that responsibility to the Executive-along with
any potential blame for CIA activities that later prove unpopular. Con-
gress would therefore have far gryeater incentive to inform itself about
the activities for which it is providing the funds.
Congress could, of course, always require appropriation and dis-
closure 130 beyond lump-sum amounts, but it is hard to be optimistic
that the courts would read the Clause as mandating more specific
appropriations or more detailed disclosure. Yet such a reading is not
implausible. If one examines the purposes of the Clause and asks
that appropriations and disclosure practices seek to accomplish them
to the fullest extent possible without posing an unreasonable threat
to national security, then the Clause requires greater detail,137 as to
135. See The Forces that Monitor and Protect, TIME, June 4, 1973, at 24.
136. Congressional interest in providing access to information which had been ex-
eipted from disclosure under the national security exception to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970), can be seen in a report by the House Government
Operations Committee on the recent amendments to the Freedom of Information Act.
See H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 11-14 (1974). President's Ford's veto of
the amendment was overridden by Congress. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1974, at 21, col. 3.
For the 1974 amendments themselves, see 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974).
137. Even luinp-sum appropriation and disclosure would prevent both Congress and
the public from fixing or analyzing internal priorities within the CIA; it would also be
impossble to determine if there has been waste, corruption, or spending prohibited by
statute or by the Constitution.
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both appropriations and accounting. The difficulty lies in determining
how much detail; the constitutional text provides little guidance.
But perhaps the present practices of most governmental agencies pro-
vide a standard. It might be argued on such a basis that appropriation
by and publication of a program classification budget and an object
classification budget are required for every agency, or possibly for
every unit within an agency which spends more than a certain
amount. 38 Whether such detail could reasonably be expected to re-
sult in placing an agent in danger or in compromising a tactical op-
eration 139 seems a closer question than that raised by lump-sum dis-
closure. It does seem unlikely that the publication of figures which
indicate that X million dollars are spent on rent, Y million on per-
sonnel, and Z million on data collection would have the feared re-
sults. 140 Where there is a reasonable probability that disclosure could
substantially threaten national security interests, the recourse would
be to appropriate and report these specific funds as expended for
confidential purposes, as is now done by the AEC and other agen-
cies. 141 Details of other appropriations and expenditures would still
be published.
138. It might be possible constitutionally to require specific appropriations and dis-
closure by any governmental unit which spends in excess of a certain sum (expressed
either as a fixed dollar amount or as a percentage of the total budget) whether or not
that unit is part of a larger agency. Even a figure as small as one hundredth of one
percent of the aggregate budget would now be roughly S30 million. Under such a sys-
tem, units with a significant expenditure of funds would receive specific appro riations
and be required to make reports. Such a requirement would increase congressional control
over policy and priorities and would provide enormous amounts of information to the
public. It would also eliminate the possibility that the CIA could simply be merged into
a larger department to provide continuing concealment of expenditures from Congress
and the public-a genuine possibility if the courts hold that the Clause requires only
that each separate agency receive a lump-sum appropriation and make a lump-sum ac-
counting.
While it might be difficult for courts to develop and apply a fixed numerical standard
of this sort, such an action would not be unprecedented. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973) (upholding Texas reapportionment plan which contained maximum population
deviation between districts of 9.9 percent); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(upholding Connecticut reapportionment plan which contained maximum population
deviation between districts of 7.83 percent). Of these two decisions the dissenters wrote:
Since the Court expresses no misgivings about our recent decision in Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182... (1971), where we held that a total deviation of 11.9% must be justified
by the State, one can reasonably surmise that a line has been drawn at 10%-devia-
tions in excess of that amount are apparently acceptable only on a showing of justi-
fication by the State; deviations of less than that amount require no justification
whatsoever.
Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See note 106 supra.
140. Elliot Richardson, however, has indicated that publication of the aggregate budget
would probably not cause any substantial difficulty, but that further breakdowns would
allow other nations to detect the emphasis which we are placing on various areas, and
that that would harm the national security. Interview with Elliot Richardson, supra note
133.
141. For example, if it were determined that disclosure of the total figure spent on
covert personnel by the CIA could reasonably be expected to cause substantial damage to
the national security, it could be omitted from the object classification "personnel" and
lumped with "confidential purposes."
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Constitutional requirements of appropriation and disclosure should
apply not only to the CIA, but also to the National Security Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the intelligence branches
of the armed forces.142 It is estimated that these agencies, along with
the CIA, spend between four and ten billion dollars annually;1 43 they
currently vary considerably in the extent of their disclosure of re-
ceipts and expenditures. 44 In each case the appropriation procedures
and the level of disclosure of receipts and expenditures would be
scrutinized to determine their relationship to the accomplishment of
the goals which Congress set for the agency, and the effect on the in-
terests sought to be protected by the legislation of alternatives involv-
ing greater disclosure. If disclosure could not reasonably be expected
to do substantial damage to these interests, 145 fuller disclosure would
be mandated. The minimum, as with the CIA, would be lump-sum
appropriation and accounting.
Conclusion
The beginnings of the Cold War drastically altered the appropria-
tions process and the availability of information about appropria-
tions and expenditures, particularly in regard to agencies which op-
erate in the area of foreign intelligence. The changes made it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to accomplish the purposes for which Article
I, § 9, Clause 7, was adopted. Congress ceased to exercise effective
control over the purse by virtually delegating its appropriations power
to another body; both Congress and the people were prevented from
142. See 119 CONG. REc. S6868 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973); The Forces that Monitor and
Protect, TIMiE, June 4, 1973, at 24; MARCH-IH & MARKS, supra note 4, at 80.
1.13. Lyman Kirkpatrick, former Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA, estimated
intelligence expenditures at between four and six billion dollars annually. Interview with
Lyman Kirkpatrick, supra note 77. Senator Proxmire estimated expenditures for foreign
intelligence at approximately six billion dollars annually. 119 CONG. REC. S6868 (daily ed.
Apr. 10, 1973). Andrew St. George estimated expenditures for intelligence at close to ten
billion dollars annually. The Cold War Comes Home, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1973, at 78.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the disparity in estimates is the difficulty in agreeing as
to which costs should be assigned to intelligence functions and which costs should be
assigned to other budget categories. This is particularly true in regard to the intelligence
activities of the various armed services. See 117 Coc.. REc. 42923-34 (1971).
144. For example, the NSA, unlike the CIA, does not even provide information about
construction. Its appropriations and expenditures are reported with those of the Defense
Department, but the total of its expenditures are witbeld. Letter from Roy R. Banner,
General Counsel of the NSA, to Elliot E. Maxwell, Feb. 13, 1974 (on file with the Yale Law
Journal). The NSA is even larger and more expensive than the CIA; estimates of its
annual budget range from one to two billion dollars. Even the executive order establishing
the NSA in 1952 has been withheld from the public. See D. KAHN, THE CODE-BREAKERS,
383-84 (Signet ed. 1973); 119 CONG'. REC. S6868 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire); MARCHErrI & MARKS, supra note 4, at 59-73.
145. See note 106 supra.
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checking expenditures for constitutionality, legality, public accept-
ance, and waste. Congress must as a whole regain control over the
appropriations power and must reassert its supervisory role over the
CIA; the people must not be deprived of their right to know how
the public money is being spent. There are certain instances in which
the withholding of details about appropriations and expenditures is
justified. But the importance of the information for the operation
of a democratic society requires that such exceptions to the consti-
tutionally mandated policy of disclosure be minimized, 146 and the
public ensured access to the maximum possible budgetary information.
146. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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